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PFO Law Reform, A Crucial First Step
Toward Sentencing Sanity in Kentucky
Robert G. Lawson'
INTRODUCTION
n a little more than 30 years, America has gone from holding 320,000
people in prisons and jails
2 to holding 2.31 million.
3 It has gone from
holding 110 prisoners for every 100,000 people
4 to holding 750 for every
100,000 people,5 and it easily leads all countries of the world in the
percentage of citizens incarcerated.
6 It has 1000 more prisons and jails
than it had in 1980, 7 has had growth in the inmate population for 33 years
I Charles S. Cassis Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.S 196o, Berea College;
J.D. 1963, University of Kentucky.
2 MARc MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 19-20 (999).
3 Pew CENTER ON THE STATES, PUBLIC SAFETY PERFORMANCE PROJECT, ONE IN ioo: BEHIND
BARS IN AMERICA 2008 5 (2008), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org. See also
PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2005 (Bureau of
Justice Statistics, May 2oo6), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjimo5.pdf.
4 Marie Gottschalk, Black Flower: Prisons and the Future ofIncarceration, 582 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 195, 197 (July 2002) ("From the mid-I920S to the early 1970s, the
incarceration rate in the United States was remarkably stable, averaging I io state and federal
prisoners per ioo,ooo people.").
5 PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 3, at 35.
6 In 2oo8, the Pew Center on the States (a charitable trust research entity based in
Washington D.C.) reported the following incarceration rates for countries around the world-
United States (750), Russia (628), England (148), Germany (93), Greece (91), Belgium (91),
France (85), Italy (67), and Denmark (67). PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 3, at 35.
In 2005, the Sentencing Project (a research entity based in Washington, D.C.) reported some
other incarceration rates in countries around the world (at a time when the U.S. rate was 726
per 1oo,ooo population)--e.g., China (118), Australia (117), Canada (I1i6) , and Japan (58).
See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, NEW INCARCERATION FIGuRs: GROWTH IN POPULATION CoNT;NuEs
I (May 2005). The average incarceration rate for the whole world has been put at about 140
inmates per 1oo,ooo population, less than one-fifth of the rate for America. See Andrew Coyle,
Prison Reform Efforts Around the World: The Role of Prison AdministratorX, 24 PACE L. REV. 825,
825-26(2004).
7 Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Industrial Complex, 282 THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY 51, 52 (Dec.
I
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in a row, and has eased into the twenty-first century without substantial
change in policies and practices that have produced such an enormous
inmate population.
The statistical picture of incarceration in Kentucky is almost identical to
the nation's picture. In the early 1970s, the state had about 3000 convicted
felons in custody, operated two prisons for men and a small prison for
women, made no use of private prisons, had no inmates housed in county
jails, and had a corrections budget of about 10 million dollars a year.9 By
February of 2008, the state had 22,719 felons under incarceration,10 owned
and operated 13 full-sized state prisons (with very few if any empty
beds)," supervised the incarceration of about 1,600 inmates in three private
prisons,"2 had more than 8000 inmates serving their sentences in county
jails across the state,'3 and had a corrections budget of about 450 million
dollars and rapidly bearing down on half-a-billion 4 (not including the very
heavy costs of prison constructionS).
In one respect, the Kentucky picture is significantly different from
the national picture. In May of 2006, the United States Bureau of Justice
Statistics reported that the country's inmate population had grown during
the most recent year by 2.6 percent, 6 substantially below its more than
6 percent growth rate through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s;"7 in this same
report, the Bureau reported that the state of Kentucky had an inmate
growth rate for the period of 6.7 percent (about 21 z times the national rate
1998).
8 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 6, at I.
9 See Robert G. Lawson, Difficult Times in Kentucky Corrections-Afershocks of a "Tough on
Crime" Philosophy, 93 Ky. L. J. 305, 323 (2005).
1o See Ky. Dep't of Corrections, Statewide Population Report (February 29, 2oo8)( un-




14 The General Assembly approved the expenditure of $449 million for fiscal year 2008-
o9 and $464.8 million for fiscal year 2oo9-zoIo. Kentucky Executive Branch Appropriations
Bill, 2oo8 Ky. Acts 480, available at http://www.lrc.ky.gov/record/o8RS/HB4o6htm.
15 Sometime after year ooo, the state completed construction of its newest prison, then
called Elliott County Phase I and now called the Little Sandy Corrections Complex. The
cost of that project was reported to be about $87 million. See Robert G. Lawson, supra note
9, at 332 n. 134. Currently operating at full capacity or above, the facility is used for medium
security imprisonment of 994 inmates. See Kentucky Department of Corrections, Statewide
Population Report No. IPTR5oo-i8 (April I, 2oo8) (unpublished population report, on file
with author).
I6 HARRISON & BECK, supra note 3, at 2.
17 Alfred Blumstein & Allen Beck, Population Growth in U.S. Prisons, 198o -1996, in




and the fourth highest in the country). s More recently (early 2008), the,
Pew Center on the States reported a growth rate for Kentucky's inmate.
population for year 2007 of 12 percent, the highest in the nation,19 a finding
that provides some perspective for more explicit data from sources closer
to home.
The first piece of this explicit data reveals recent growth in Kentucky's
inmate population that is astounding and almost unbelievable-an increase
in this population of 3218 inmates from January 1, 2004, to June 30, 20060
(a mere 30 months), and an additional increase of 2402 inmates during
calendar year 2007.21 (In weighing this information, it is helpful to know
that it took the state almost 200 years to reach an inmate population of
3000 for the first time.) The second piece of this explicit data consists of
projections from the state's corrections professionals that ought to scare the
politics out of lawmakers, projections showing the state with 31,057 felony
inmates in year 2014 (an increase of 9000 inmates over the next seven
years, an increase that could easily be much bigger if the state's recent
trend continues).
22
How did we do this? United States Supreme Court Justice Anthony
Kennedy offered succinct thoughts on this subject in a 2003 address to the
American Bar Association:
... In countries such as England, Italy, France, and Germany, the incarceration
rate is about 1 in 1000 persons. In the United States it is about 1 in 143 ..
. Our resources are misspent, our punishments too severe, our sentences
too long.
2 3
While Justice Kennedy spoke of the nation, he could easily have been
speaking of Kentucky, for we have seized every opportunity for three
decades to make punishments harsher on criminals. We have elevated
an untold number of misdemeanors to felonies, 4 have pushed sentences
I8 HARRISON & BECK, supra note 3, at I.
19 PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 3, at 8.
20 See Ky. Dep't of Corrections, Adult Institutions Daily Count Sheet (January 5, 2004)
(unpublished daily count sheet, on file with author). Ky. Dep't of Corrections,Adult Institutions
Daily Count Sheet (June 30, zoo6) (unpublished daily count sheet, on file with author).
21 PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 3, at 8.
22 See Ky. Dep't of Corrections, Forecasted Populations 2004-2014 (undated) (unpub-
lished forecast, on file with author).
23 Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting
(August 9, 2003), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp
- ° 8- ° 9-o3.html
(last visited Oct. 2, 2oo6).
24 For example, nonsupport was a misdemeanor under the 1974 Penal Code (see Act of
Apr. 2, 1974, ch. 406, § 261, 1974 Ky. Acts 870) and under a new label flagrant nonsupport is
now a felony (Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 530.050 (1988)); unlawful transaction with a minor was a
misdemeanor under the 1974 Penal Code (see Act of Apr. 2, 1974, ch. 4o6, § 263, 1974 Ky. Acts
871) and under current law is classified in some situations as a high level felony (Ky. REv. STAT.
2oo8-2oo9]
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higher through reclassification of crimes"5 and the enactment of a wide
assortment of penalty enhancements, 6 and have eliminated parole for a
long and ever-expanding list of serious offenses (the so-called "truth in
sentencing" law).2 7 In fact, we have left very few areas of our criminal
law untouched by a philosophy devoted almost exclusively to harsher
punishment of offenders.
And to what end? Those who have steered the country and our state
in this direction believe that tougher penalties produce lower crime rates
and safer communities. Scholars who have most closely examined this
relationship are skeptical:
In the recent past and continuing through the present, crime prevention
policy in the United States has been driven by attempts to produce
deterrence by providing increasingly severe prison sentences for crimes.
Evidence is emerging that, apart from being extremely costly, the
lengthening of sentences is also ineffective. 8
A reasonable assessment of the research to date-with a particular focus
on studies conducted in the past decade-is that sentence severity has no
effect on the level of crime in society.2 9
ANN. § 530.064 (2007) and Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §530.065 (1998)); and indecent exposure was a
low level misdemeanor under the 1974 Penal Code (see Acts of Apr. 2, 1974, ch. 4o6, § 95, 1974
Ky. ACTS 847-48) and under current law is a class D felony in some situations (Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN.§ 510.148 (2004)).
25 For example, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon was a class D felony under
the 1974 Penal Code (see Act of Apr. 2, 1974, ch. 4o6, § 237, 1974 Ky. Acts 867) and is now a
class C felony (Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 527.040 (1994)); (arson in the first degree was a class B
felony and arson in the second degree was a class C felony under the 1974 Penal Code (seeAct
of Apr. 2, I974, ch. 406, §§ 114-115, 1974 Ky. Acts 85o) and are now a class A felony and a class
B felony respectively (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§513.020-513.O30)
26 For example, the penalty for unauthorized use of an automobile is enhanced from
misdemeanor to felony if the defendant has a prior conviction of auto theft (Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 514. 100 (I980)), the penalty for knowingly receiving stolen property is enhanced from
misdemeanor to felony if the property is a firearm and is enhanced from a class D felony to
either a class B or class A felony if the stolen property is received with intent to manufacture
methampthetamine (Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 514.110 (2000)), and the penalty for assault in the
fourth degree is enhanced from misdemeanor to felony if the victim is a family member and
the defendant has two prior convictions of assaulting family members (Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.§
508.032 (2000)).
27 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 439.3401 (2007).
28 John M. Darley, On the Unlikely Prospect of Reducing Crime Rates by Increasing the Severity
of Prison Sentences, 13 J. LAW & PoLIcY 189, 193 (2005).
29 Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl M. Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null
Hypothesis, in 26 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH I, 143 (Michael Tony & Joan
Perersilia, eds., 1999).
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It might have been reasonable to expect crime to have declined as a result
of the quadrupling of the incarceration rate ... , but no such connection has
been displayed.3"
And the best available statistical data is also unsupportive of the tough-
on-crime advocates, as shown in the two charts set out below:
Figure 1
Crime Rates (Per 100,000 Population)
6 0 0 0 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------.. ..
600'
5 0 0 0 -- - -- - -- - -.-.--..-.-.-- -----.




Source: United States Bureau of Justice Statistics"
Figure 2
Prison Inmates (Per 100,000 Population)
5 0 0 .... ... ........ .... .. ..........  ...... ............ ............ .. .. ... . ....... ...--- _  /__,00 -......4 A 5
iiillIl
10: -* * - tt-t11 " ....00% 000 0 0 0%  %0 0 O0% 0
Source: United States Bureau of Justice Statistics"
30 Blumstein & Beck, supra note 17, at 56.
31 U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Estimated Number and Rate (per 1oo,ooo inhabitants)
of Offenses Known to Police, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, available at
http/www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t3 1 o62oo4.pdf (last visited on June 8, 2oo8).
32 U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Rate (per Ioo,ooo of resident population) of Sentenced
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. The crime rate moved up and down between 1970 and 2000 but ended
the period very close to where it started (less than one-half of a percent
higher); the inmate rate moved rapidly higher during the entire period
and finished almost 400 percent above where it began (increasing from 96
inmates in prison for every 100,000 population in 1970 to 478 inmates in
2000).
3 3 Such data lends support to a very serious possibility: "[I]nsofar
as the public is being sold such policies on crime reduction grounds, my
conclusion is that we have substantial reason for believing it is being sold a
bill of goods." 4
Nonetheless, the public support and enthusiasm needed to sustain
the incarceration experiment remains intact for the most part, impedes
comprehensive law reform initiatives, and permits the thirty-year-old
war on crime to roar ahead.3" On the other hand, there are for the first
time some signs of exhaustion with the war, some doubts about long range
costs and benefits of mass incarceration, and in a few quarters even some
concerns about the morality of penalties that are never harsh enough to
satisfy the crime fighters. There is still a fear in lawmaking circles of the
soft-on-crime label, but there is also an appreciation for the possibility that
the tough-on-crime advocates have created at least as many problems as
they have solved, enough of the former to suffocate any effort to promote
across-the-board moderation of punishments but enough of the latter to
spark some hope for modest law reform aimed at the very worst excesses of
the tough-on-crime movement.
One of the worst excesses of Kentucky's tough-on-crime movement is
a repeat offender statute (called the persistent felony offender law) that is
easily the most lethal weapon in the state's tough sentencing arsenal. The
persistent felony offender (PFO) law clearly heads the list of tough-on-
crime measures that have filled prisons and jails beyond capacity, pushed
the state's corrections budget off the charts, and changed the balance of
Prisoners Under Jurisdiction of State and Federal Correctional Authorities on December 31,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/
pdf/t6292oo6.pdf (last visited on June 8, zoo8).
33 It should be noted that the incarceration rate reported in Figure 2 only counts inmates
incarcerated in state and federal prison (mostly convicted felons) and does not count inmates
in the country's jail systems. If jail inmates are added to the numbers in Figure I, the incar-
ceration rate for year 2000 would stand at 683 inmates per ioo,ooo population. See HARRISON
& BECK, supra note 3, at 2.
34 Richard Lippke, Crime Reduction and the Length of Prison Sentences, 24 LAW & POLICY
17, 18 (2002).
35 See e.g., Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Geology of DrugPolicy in 2002, 14 FED. SENT. REP. 123
(2001-2002) ( "One of the verities of American political life for the last thirty years has been
that no politician ever lost an election by promising to be 'tougher' on those who use and sell
drugs."); Marc Mauer, Why Aie Tough on Crime Policies So Popular?, I I STAN. L. & PoL'Y REV. 9,
12 (199) ("It appears that a primary goal of harsh sentencing policies has been to satisfy the
needs of politicians in their seemingly insatiable desire to appear to be 'tough on crime."').
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power over punishment in ways that threaten the basic fairness of the
justice system. It deserves much credit for intolerable conditions that exist
in at least some corrections facilities, devours corrections resources badly
needed for rehabilitation and reentry efforts, and merits most of the blame
for a never-ending need for more prison space. It is the centerpiece of
sentencing laws and a sentencing regime that have been subjected to 30
years worth of ad hoc legislative action propelled mostly by an impulse to
get tough on criminals and the great illusion that in harsher punishment
there is some kind of quick fix to the crime problem. The end result is
a set of sentencing laws that lack coherence, consistency, philosophy, and
fairness, that drain the public treasury while exacerbating conditions in
corrections facilities that are already shameful, and that fail in remarkable
fashion to live up to the values and expectations of the justice system:
... Sentencing law is arguably the most important area of law. The sanctions
available against offenders target the most cherished and coveted individual
interests, such as the right to liberty and property. Sentencing law is too
important to not get 'right. 
36
The sentencing laws of the Kentucky Penal Code are too important
not to get "right," and they are not "right." The entire package cries out
for major reform, reform that is absolutely crucial to any effort by the state
to end its inmate explosion and the mass incarceration it has pursued for
thirty years to no end.
The purpose of this article is to engage in some analysis and discussion
of the part of this sentencing law that cries out loudest for reform (the state's
PFO law37), reform that in short order would begin to deflate the population
that has our prisons and jails grossly overcrowded. In this analysis and
discussion, there is some brief consideration of the justifications used to
support repeat offender laws (Part I), a segment on the history and evolution
of Kentucky's law (Part II), an examination of a selection of repeat offender
laws from other states (Part III), a report on two field studies of the use of
the PFO law in two Kentucky courts (Parts IV and V), and a concluding
argument in support of a return to sentencing sanity that once prevailed in
our laws and in our justice system.
I. PHILOSOPHY, PURPOSE, AND REALITY
Repeat offender statutes exist in one form or another in almost all states,
better known by the baseball metaphor "three strikes and you're out."
They are embraced in some circles for deterrence they are believed to
36 Mirko Bagaric & Richard Edney, The Sentencing Advisory Commission and the Hope of
Smarter Sentencing, 16 CURRENT ISSUES IN CRIM. JUST. 125 (2004) (emphasis added).
37 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.080 (1974).
2oo8-2oo9]
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provide for high rate offenders and in others for the elevated incapacitation
they are known to provide.3 Doubt regarding their deterrence value is
widespread, mostly because of studies such as the following:
"The findings suggest that 76 percent of active criminals and 89 percent
of the most violent criminals either perceive no risk of apprehension or are
incognizant of the likely punishments for their crimes." If this is so, the
sentence for a particular crime does not act as a deterrent in the mind of the
potential criminal.39
Fifty-two of the 60 prisoners reported that they did not think that they
would be caught and, as a result, punishment size was unimportant. Thirty-
two of the same 60 apparently did not know what the punishment would
likely be. Most (51 of the 60) believe that they would not be arrested.
4
0
Almost as much doubt about their incapacitation value exists in some
circles, because of the difficulty of identifying high rate offenders and the
extremely high costs of incarcerating an aging inmate population:
Even if it were possible-which it is not-to identify accurately the most
criminally active 6 percent of the male population, it would require a massive
expansion of the prison system to incarcerate these offenders.
41
38 Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Habitual OffenderStatutes and CriminalDeterrence,
34 CONN. L. REv. 55, 56-57 (2001) ("[T]hey argue, Three Strikes can have a significant impact
on the crime rate, by either deterring these career criminals from committing further crimes,
or, if they are not deterred, by removing them from the street by sentencing them to long
prison terms.").
39 Darley, supra note 28, at 196, quoting David Anderson, The Deterrence Hypothesis and
Picking Posckets at the Pickpocket's Hanging, 4 A. L. & ECON. REV. 295, 302-4 (2202). See also
Chuck Colson & Pat Nolan, Prescription for Safer Communities, I8 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS
& PuB. POi'y 387, 388 (2004) ("[Tlhe conservatives said that the penalties for crime were too
lenient; that if we ratcheted up the sentences criminals would turn to other lines of work. Yet
that presumes that criminals are rational calculators, carefully weighing the consequences of
their actions. Our experiences in prison belie that. Neither of us ever met an inmate that
thought they would get caught, and certainly most did not have the foggiest idea what the
penalties for their crime were when they committed the crime.")
40 Doob & Webster, supra note, 29 at 182.
41 Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Do Three Strikes Laws Make Sense? Habitual
Offender Statutes and Criminal Incapacitation, 87 GEo. L. J. io3, 115 (t998). See also Samara
Marion, Justice by Geography? A Study of San Diego County 's Three Strikes Sentencing Practices From
July-December t996, I I STAN. L. & Po'v REV. 29,41 (1999-2OOO) ("Contrary to its proponents'
original claims that the law would keep 'rapists, murderers, and child molesters behind bars




... Three Strikes fills prison cells with offenders who are not particularly
dangerous and who are aging. Not only are they less dangerous as they age,
but they are also more expensive to maintain. In addition to the cost of
prison construction, the state pays about $26,000 per year to warehouse an
average offender. By contrast, older felons cost the state between $40,000
and $70,000 per year. When those figures are projected into the future, the
results are staggering .... 42
Nonetheless, driven by a very powerful intuitive belief that harsh
punishment matters in crime control efforts, these laws have survived in
most if not all states and for some time have occupied center stage in the
war-on-crime, with little if any careful scrutiny by lawmakers and the
potential to unleash at some point a problem of huge proportions:
The reality is that criminals sentenced under harsh systems ... are being
released. Eight or ten years ago, we could say that we will "lock them up
and throw away the key," or more realistically, lock them up now and worry
about how to deal with their release when the time comes-somewhere
in the distant future. However, that future is now upon us. The time for
release is today or tomorrow or soon.
Those serious criminals will re-enter the free population. When they do
so, they will have been confined for longer, with fewer remaining links to
their families and communities, and having had less treatment and training
than when resources were not so scarce and when there was more emphasis
on rehabilitation. That is a reality we must face. The burning question is
whether those released are citizens who will be successfully reintegrated
into society, or are convicts, who in large numbers will re-offend at terrible
costs.
43
The Kentucky version of these laws is especially draconian and
problematic, because of the unusually wide net it casts and the huge
contributions it has made to the incarceration explosion of the last 30
years. Like most such laws, it owes its existence to public anger, political
expediency, and a lack of careful thought about long-term effects on
42 Michael Vitiello, Reforming Three Strikes' Excesses, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. i, 16-17 (2004).
See also Beres & Griffith, supra note 41, at 132 ("States that include minor offenses as strikes
also may sentence older offenders to long prison terms when these offenders no longer pose a
significant danger to society."); Lippke, supra note 34, at p. 23 ("[Olne of the best-established
findings of criminology is that crime rates decline as individuals age. Crime is overwhelm-
ingly the province of young males ... This suggests that blanket policies of lengthy prison
terms for serious crimes will generally be ineffective as a means of reducing crimes once of-
fenders reach their thirties.").
43 Robert P. Mosteller, New Dimensions in Sentencing Reform in the Twenty-First Century, 82
ORE. L. REv. 1, 24-25 (2003).
2oo8-zoo9]
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inmates and fairness in the assignment of punishment for bad behavior.
It has evolved into a truly lethal sentencing weapon without serious
consideration of the possibility that its benefits might be outweighed by its
very high costs and an uncertain but real threat to public safety. Thoughts
about this possibility and about the need for reform of this law fill the
remaining pages of this article, beginning with a description of how this
law evolved into the very lethal weapon that it is.
II. KENTUCKY'S REPEAT OFFENDER LAW
A. The 1974 Penal Code
After five years of careful study,' the Kentucky General Assembly
repealed most of the state's criminal statutes in 1974 and adopted what
is now called the Kentucky Penal Code,45 barely ahead of the hardening
of attitudes toward criminals and while lawmakers still had a taste for
rehabilitation as a core if not overriding function of incarceration. The
sentencing provisions of the new code (consistent with predominant views
of the time) retained largely intact the state's longstanding commitment
to indeterminate sentencing. They adopted a narrow penalty range for
each felony offense,46 required sentences to have maximum periods of
imprisonment but no minimum periods, and left the Parole Board with
very wide discretion to determine how much actual time convicted felons
would serve in prison.
47
In using penalty ranges for sentencing, the 1974 Code was designed to
promote proportionality (punishments commensurate with the seriousness
of crimes) without depriving sentencing authorities of the flexibility needed
for proper consideration of matters peculiar to individual offenders (age,
employment history, drug and alcohol use, mental capacity, etc.) and, most
importantly, criminal histories. In every felony classification, the penalty
range was wide enough for a separation of high and low rate offenders and
for significantly harsher punishment for deserving repeat offenders. The
objective was to provide for balance between extremes, for punishment
44 See Ky. Crime Comm'n & Legislative Research Comm'n, Kentucky Penal Code: Final
Draft ( 97 1) [hereinafter Penal Code: Final Draft].
45 Act of Apr. i, 1944, ch. 406, § 278, 1974 Ky. Acts 873.
46 The least serious felony crime (called Class D felony) had a penalty range of I to 5
years, slightly more serious felonies (called Class C felony) had a range of 5 to so years, the
next more serious felony (class B felony) had a range of sO to 2o, and the most serious felony
(class A) had a penalty range of 20 years to life imprisonment. See Act of Apr. 2, 1974, ch. 406,
§ 278, 1974 Ky. Acts 873.
47 "The actual length of his imprisonment is to be determined by the Parole Board in
much the same manner as is done under the existing process. No minimum period of im-
prisonment is established in this code for a convicted felon." Penal Code: Final Draft, supra
note 44, at 342.
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partly tailored to the offense and partly tailored to the offender (striving
to give offenders no more than they deserved and society no more than it
needed).
Under this approach, prosecutors had some influence over penalties
by virtue of their charging authority but most of the front end power
in sentencing was held by trial judges. They had virtually unlimited
discretion to substitute probation for imprisonment (and were encouraged
by statute to use it),4" had the responsibility in cases resolved by guilty plea
for fixing defendants' maximum terms of imprisonment, and had authority
to reduce penalties fixed by juries to lesser penalties within the applicable
penalty ranges.49 The authority and discretion of judges was unimpaired
by mandatory minimum penalties and very few if any penalty enhancers,
except for the new code's repeat offender law.
B. The 1974 PFO Law
In one instance, the 1974 Code abandoned its commitment to
proportionality in punishment, shifted its focus in sentencing from
rehabilitation to incapacitation, and added to the Code a statute known
then and now as the persistent felony offender law. In this one departure
from the sentencing policies and practices described above, 0 lawmakers
embraced a more punitive philosophy toward offenders who were believed
to be resistant to the deterrent effects of proportional punishment and who
had squandered opportunities to change their behaviors. They had a very
small target (felons who had committed crimes, who had been punished,
and who then committed more crimes) and no reason to fear an inmate
explosion for the prison system:
The 1974 Code carefully.., guaranteed that its "three strikes" law would
be used only against high-rate offenders who had been unresponsive to
extended rehabilitation efforts by the state. In addition to requiring the
48 See Act of Apr. 2, 1974, ch. 406, § 285, 1974 Ky. Acts 875.
49 See Act of Apr. 2, 1974, ch. 406, § 283, 1974 Ky. Acts 874.
50 The effect of the PFO law on penalties varied from one felony class to another, al-
though the objective and effect was to push all persistent offenders into harsher penalty cat-
egories. In the highest category of offender (Class A felony), instead of the normal range of
20 years to life, the persistent offender was given a life sentence automatically; in the next
highest category (class B felony), instead of a normal range of 10 to 20 years, the persistent
offender was moved into the range normally applicable to class A felons, not less than 2o years
or more than life; in the next to lowest category (class C felony), instead of a normal range of
5 to in years, the persistent offender was moved into the range normally applicable to class
B felons, 10 to 20 years; and in the lowest category (class D felony), instead of a normal range
of i to 5 years, the persistent offender was moved into the same range used for the persistent
felony offender who committed a class C felony, 10 to 20 years. It should be noted that the
offender who suffered the worst under this law was the least serious offender. See Act of Apr.
2, 1974, ch. 406, § 28o, 1974 Ky. Acts 873-74.
2008-2009]
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commission of a third offense .... the original "persistent felony offender"
provision of the Code ... required for "three strikes" punishments that the
defendant be found to have committed his/her third offense after having
been subjected to imprisonment on two separate occasions ......
Nothing short of three convictions and two separate periods of
imprisonment"2 would trigger the "three strikes" option and its very
harsh penalties. The option was meant for extraordinary use, and, in the
early years of its life, it was used as contemplated: in 1980, five years after
enactment of the 1974 law, the state had about 4000 inmates in prison with
a mere 79 of that number carrying elevated sentences under the persistent
felony offender law.53 By this date, however, Kentucky's version of the
tough-on-crime movement was in full bloom and the repeat offender law
of 1974 was much too soft to survive.
C. A New and Very Different PFO Law
The Kentucky General Assembly took early and careful aim at the 1974
PFO law and in a single piece of legislation 4 converted it into a sentencing
weapon of monumental proportions. Well ahead of most states, and before
"tough on crime" became a galvanizing political slogan, the penal code
of Kentucky had one of the most far-reaching repeat offender laws ever
enacted. The conversion from a sentencing tool for occasional use to one
of the most far-reaching ever enacted resulted from a combination of
three changes that were made to the 1974 law and one change that was not
made:
One: The mostfundamental of the three changes involved a redefinition of what
is a "strike" for PFO punishment enhancement. The 1974 law had defined
"strike" as a felony conviction that had sent the defendant to state prison
for actual incarceration, a definition that was designed to significantly
reduce the pool of offenders eligible for PFO punishment. In the overhaul,
there was no requirement of imprisonment in the definition of "strike"
and nothing in its place to guard against an overuse of its extraordinary
punishment of repeat offenders. In opening the door to long prison terms for
offenders who had never seen the inside of a prison, lawmakers abandoned
the notion they once held "that 'three strikes' laws are defensible only as a
last resort measure against incorrigible offenders."55
51 Lawson, supra note 9, at 336.
52 Two or more convictions with sentences served concurrently or consecutively were
counted as one for "three strikes" purposes. Act of Apr. 2, 1974, ch. 406, § 280(3), 1974 Ky.
Acts 873.
53 See Ky. Dep't of Corr., Kentucky Dep't. of Corr. History, 195 1-I995, http://corrections.
ky.gov/CorrectionsHistory/Corrections-History-Part3.htm (last visited on Sept. 25, 2004).
54 See Act of Mar. 29, I976, ch. i8o, § 283, 1976 Ky. Acts 425.
55 See Lawson, supra note 9, at 338.
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Two: The most significant of the three changes in the 1974 law was a reduction
of the number of "strikes" needed for PFO status from three to two. In a second
departure from its earlier "last resort" philosophy, the General Assembly
added to its now toughened "three strikes" law a new "two strikes" law,
providing for enhanced rather than ordinary punishment of any offender
who had earlier been convicted of a single felony offense (again without
any requirement of prior incarceration from that conviction).,6 With this
change, lawmakers eliminated all restraint on the use of extraordinary
punishment of repeat offenders, shifted the tough-on-crime movement
into a higher gear, and added to the state's sentencing arsenal a weapon far
more likely to come into play than the "three strikes" weapon.
Three- The last of the changes in the 1974 law had the effect of elevating real
punishments of repeat offenders. Believing it needed to close "loopholes"
in PFO penalties, the legislature eliminated the possibility of probation
for all repeat offenders57 and more importantly closed the door to early
parole for "three strikes" offenders: "A ... persistent felony offender in
the first degree shall not be eligible for ... parole until having served a
minimum term of imprisonment of not less than ten years."58 Although
the mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years was later eliminated for the
lowest classification of repeat offender (class D felons 9 ), it was kept intact
for all others6° and added to the repeat offender law a new capacity to push
the state's inmate population to unsupportable levels.
Four: The change in the 1974 law that was not made by this modifying
legislation involved the definition of what is commonly called a "triggering offense"
(the so-called last strike needed to bring persistent offender enhancement into play).
The 1974 law used the most liberal of all definitions of "triggering offense"
(namely any one of the state's many felony crimes), something it could do
without opening the door to irrational punishment because of the way in
which it defined and used its "strike" requirements (two prior convictions
with two separate periods of incarceration in state prison). The modified
law used the same definition with very different consequences.
After these developments, the PFO law had an extremely liberal and
far-reaching definition of "triggering offense," an equally liberal and far-
reaching definition of "strike," and absolutely nothing to shrink the pool
of repeat offenders who would qualify for extraordinary punishment. A
significant increase in the PFO prison population was now guaranteed.
56 See Act of Mar. 29, 1976, ch. i8o, § 1, 1976 Ky. Acts 425.
57 See Act of Mar. 29, 1976, ch. i8o, § i(5), 1976 Ky. Acts 425.
58 See Act of Mar. 29, 1976, ch. i8o, § I, 1976 Ky. Acts 425.
59 A class D felony is the lowest of four felony classifications in Kentucky's law, carries
normal penalties of i to 5 years in prison, and includes such crimes as theft, drug possession,
and prostitution. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 532.010 (1975).




The 79 PFO inmates in the 1980 prison population were made to look
insignificant in short order: "By 1984, that number had skyrocketed to
1,142 inmates and had only begun to have its long-term effect on the
inmate population explosion ... .-"61 In the twenty-four years since 1984,
the state has incarcerated several thousand inmates carrying the PFO status
and its enhanced punishment and at the present time has a very substantial
population of such inmates. And in these numbers one has no more than
half the story concerning the impact of this law on the inmate population.
The other half concerns the uncountable number of convicted felons who
accept higher-than-normal terms in prison as a result of plea bargaining
driven by a need and desire to obtain dismissal of PFO charges. And then
beyond the numbers there is an invisible and largely unappreciated impact
of this law on core principles of justice.
Beyond providing fuel for prison growth and overcrowding beyond
almost anyone's imagination, this law (more than any of the other "tough-
on-crime" measures) gives to the prosecution absolutely enormous
power and control over punishment, all at the expense of power and
control that once rested in the more impartial hands of the judiciary. An
adversarial balance that once dominated the criminal justice system has
been victimized by unprecedented, unguided, and largely unchecked
prosecutorial discretion to dictate sentences, evidenced most clearly by the
ever increasing percentage of cases resolved by guilty plea and a virtual
disappearance of the criminal trial,6" a troubling and largely unexplored
phenomenon that is to be revisited in a later segment of this article.
III. REPEAT OFFENDER LAWS OF OTHER STATES
The harshness of repeat offender laws depends upon how they combine
four characteristics-( 1) the kinds of crimes that bring enhanced penalties
into play (so-called "triggering offenses"), (2) the kinds of prior convictions
that qualify offenders for extraordinary punishment (so-called "strikes"),
61 See Lawson, supra note 9, at 339-
62 See e.g., Frank 0. Bowman, III, Mr Madison Meets a Time Machine: The Political Science of
FederalSentencing Reform 58 STAN. L. REV. 235, 251 (2005) ("The ability to threaten defendants
with very long sentences if they do not plead guilty or... cooperate against others is a hugely
powerful tool in inducing pleas and securing cooperation .... As the Guidelines and associated
statutes have grown ever more complex, giving prosecutors ever more bargaining chips, the
rate of guilty pleas has steadily increased...."); Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction:
Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1211, 1252 (2004) ("The overwhelming and dominant
fact of the federal sentencing system ... is the virtually absolute power the system has given
prosecutors over federal prosecution and sentencing. There is a lot of evidence to support




(3) the number of prior convictions needed for repeat offender status
(two, three, four), and (4) the effect on normal penalties of being treated
as a repeat offender. In most states, these laws are sold to the public as
weapons for use against offenders who are especially dangerous:
... Those who favor Three Strikes laws argue that a small group of high rate
offenders commits most of the serious crime and that these laws can identify
and incapacitate such high rate offenders .... 63
S.. The purpose of these laws is simple: Offenders convicted repeatedly of
serious offenses should be removed from society for long periods of time, in
many cases for life.64
If true to this objective, such laws would cast their nets only over the
worst of society's repeat offenders and would preserve the principle of
proportionality as the cardinal determinant of punishment for all others.
More than just a few repeat offender laws, probably a very substantial
majority, are in fact true to this objective and cast their nets over no more than
a tiny percentage of repeat offenders. A few states achieve this objective
by allowing for enhanced punishment only after offenders have served
multiple periods of imprisonment (as Kentucky once did). 65 But a much
greater number of states accomplish this objective by the ways in which
they define "triggering offense" (current charges that bring enhancement
into play) and "strikes" (convictions needed for repeat offender status),
as shown by the set of state laws described below (formatted for easy
comparison with Kentucky's repeat offender law) and by an additional
representative group described in the appendix:
63 Beres & Griffith, supra note 41, at 103 (emphasis added).
64 John Clark, James Austin, & D. Alan Henry, "Three Strikes and & You're Out": A Review
of State Legislation, National Institute of Justice, p. i (September 1997) (emphasis added).
See also Vitiello, supra note 42, at 1-2 ("Campaign literature backing the [California three
strikes) initiative claimed that '3 STRIKES SAVES LIVES AND TAXPAYER DOLLARS!'
and would keep 'career criminals, who rape women, molest innocent children, and commit
murder, behind bars where they belong."').
65 Some states rely mostly if not solely on the requirement of prior terms of actual im-
prisonment (in defining prior "strikes") in order to limit the reach of their repeat offenders
laws. See e.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 279, § 25 (Lexis 2008) (requiring two prior felonies convic-
tions with two separate terms of imprisonment for three-strikes status); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 691-6 (West zooI) (requiring two terms of imprisonment ahead of commission of the trig-
gering offense for three-strikes status); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2221 (Reissue 1995) (requiring
convictions and imprisonment for felonies counted as "strikes" in applying its "three strikes"
laws). Other states require prior convictions with imprisonment for some of its repeat of-
fender provisions but not all. Seee.g., N.Y. LAw § 70.00-70. 10. (Consol. 2oo8); Miss. CODE ANN.





1. Types: two-strikes and three-strikes laws.
2. Triggering Offense: manslaughter, arson, robbery, first degree assault or
serious sex offense.
3. Strike: any conviction of one of the foregoing crimes or comparably
dangerous crime, but only if it resulted in actual imprisonment.
4. Penalties: for a second strike normal penalties are doubled and for a third
strike they are enhanced to "no more than life in prison."
INDIANA
67
1. Type: three-strikes law.
2. Triggering Offense: a serious felony crime (such as murder, battery with
a deadly weapon, confinement with a deadly weapon, kidnapping, rape,
burglary with a deadly weapon, arson, robbery with a deadly weapon, and
death causing DUI).
3. Strike: any conviction of a serious felony crime (from those listed above).
4. Penalties: for a third strike, normal penalties are enhanced to life
imprisonment without parole.
MARYLAND 68
1. Types: two-strikes, three-strikes, and four-strikes laws.
2. Triggering Offense: a crime of violence from a short list of most dangerous
to person offenses.
3. Strike: for two-strikes, one conviction for a crime of violence resulting in
actual imprisonment; for three-strikes, two convictions for crimes of violence
with one resulting in actual imprisonment; and for four-strikes, three
convictions of crimes of violence all resulting in actual imprisonment.
4. Penalties: for a second strike, normal penalties are left intact except for a
minimum sentence of 10 years, for a third strike, penalties are enhanced to




1. Type: two-strikes violent offender law.
2.Triggering Offense: aggravated murder, murder, involuntary manslaughter,
or a felony involving infliction or attempt to inflict serious bodily injury.
3. Strike: a conviction for a violent offense that would qualify as a triggering
offense.
4. Penalties: a mandatory prison term at the upper end of the penalty range
66 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53(a)-4o (West 1969).
67 IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-50-2-8.5 (West 1994).
68 MD. ANN. CODE art. 5, § 905 (2oo8).
69 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.01, 2929.14 (LexisNexis 1998).
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for the triggering offense.
SOUTH CAROLINA
70
1. Types: two-strikes and three-strikes law.
2. Triggering Offense: for two-strikes, a "most serious offense" (murder,
voluntary manslaughter, homicide by child abuse, assault and battery
with intent to kill, criminal sexual assault, assault with intent to commit
criminal sexual conduct, kidnapping, arson or burglary in first degree, armed
robbery, damaging property with explosives, or other offenses causing
or threatening death); for three strikes, a "serious offense" (any crime
punishable by a maximum term of 30 years or more, lynching, engaging
child in sex performance, and other serious crimes such as trafficking in
drugs, trafficking within proximity of a school, and causing death by vehicle
while under the influence).
3. Strike: for two-strikes, conviction of a "most serious offense"; for three-
strikes, conviction of a "most serious offense" or a "serious offense."
4. Penalties: normal penalties are elevated to life in prison without privilege
of parole under both laws.
Virginia7
1. Type: three-strikes law.
2. Triggering Offense: a crime involving an "act of violence" (murder,
voluntary manslaughter, mob-related felonies, kidnapping or abduction,
malicious felony assault or bodily wounding, robbery and carjacking,
criminal sexual assault, arson of occupied structure, or conspiracy to commit
any of these crimes).
3. Strike: a conviction of a crime involving an "act of violence" (from
triggering offense list).
4. Penalties: normal penalties are elevated to life imprisonment without
privilege of parole.
In these laws and others like them
7 there is no assassination of the
proportionality principle and very little fuel for an inmate explosion in the
prison systems:
Three strikes statutes that limit strikes to violent felonies like robbery,
kidnapping, and rape do little to change prior sentencing practices. Few
individuals are convicted three times for these offenses, and those convicted
are likely to serve long prison terms without regard to Three Strikes laws
73
70 S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45 (1976).
71 VA. CODE ANN. § 19. 2-297.1 (1994).
72 The repeat offender laws in the attached appendix are virtually identical to the ones
described in the text.
73 Beres & Griffith, supra note 4i, at i i i.
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Early evidence suggests that most of the ["three strikes"] laws will have
minimal impact on their respective State prison systems. States have
drafted these laws so that they would be applied to only the most violent
repeat offenders. In most States these offenders were already receiving
lengthy prison terms under existing statutes .... "
And on all counts and all scores the Kentucky law could hardly be
any more different than it is from these laws. While these laws aim at
serious offenders with a history of serious crimes, the Kentucky law
throws a blanket over the entire pool of repeat offenders (by defining both
"triggering offense" and "strike" to include "any felony crime"), promotes
a sentencing regime with the capability of overwhelming the prison
system, and above all else authorizes lengthy prison terms for offenders
who pose very little (and oftentimes no) threat to public safety. To be
sure, the Kentucky law will ensnare some very dangerous offenders and
send them to state prison for long periods of time. But for no reason other
than the simple fact that minor offenders outnumber serious offenders by
an extremely wide margin, this law is sure to produce a flood of property,
drug, and other relatively minor offenders carrying very heavy sentences
and posing virtually no risk of serious harm to members of the public. Are
its benefits outweighed by its costs to the corrections system and to persons
who must bear the heavy burden of disproportionate punishment?
The field studies described in the next two parts of the article underscore
the importance of pondering this question.
IV. PFO PRACTICES IN FAYETTE COUNTY
A. Introduction
There has been very little examination of the operation of Kentucky's
PFO law in practice and as a result there is little appreciation of the
contribution it has made to the conditions that prevail in the state's prisons
and jails. Statistics from corrections sources show rapid growth over time
of the number of inmates held under PFO status (from 79 in 1980 to 4,187
in 2004) but provide very little data about the nature of this population and
even less about the extent to which the relationship between punishment
and seriousness of crime is affected by the operation of this law.
With these voids of information in mind, field studies were conducted by
the author in two counties (Fayette and Scott) with intent to shed light on
the following inquiries: (1) the extent to which the law is used to enhance
punishments (the frequency of its use), (2) the kinds of offenders subjected
to its harsh penalties, (3) the extent to which it produces disproportionate
74 Clark et al., supra note 64, at 13.
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punishments, and (4) the consistency (or a lack thereof) of its use from one
territorial jurisdiction to another. The results of the first study are reported
in this section of the article.
B. Scope of the Study
All felony prosecutions for calendar year 2003 in Fayette Circuit Court
were examined for this study (with this calendar year selected so that
cases would have time to move through the court system to a conclusion).
The number of files reviewed totaled about 1600 with approximately
1400 cases ending with a final disposition in the Circuit Court (with the
balance being sent to a lower court for disposition or left unresolved for
one reason or another). The number of cases involving PFO charges was
378-153 involving PFO first degree (PFO Ist) (requiring proof of two prior
convictions) and 225 involving PFO second degree (PFO 2 nd) (requiring
proof of one prior conviction); in other words, almost 1 out of every 4 cases
reviewed (378 out of 1600) involved a prosecution under the state's repeat
offender laws.
The case files began with grand jury indictments and ended with
judgments of the court (except for those sent to the lower court or left
unresolved). The number of PFO prosecutions that ended with a final
disposition (out of the 1400 cases reviewed) totaled 302-126 involving
PFO 1 charges and 176 involving PFO 2 nd charges. There was enough
information in case files to paint a sketch of the criminal conduct under
scrutiny and precise data on current charges, prior convictions, and final
disposition of charges. A very high percentage of these cases (and all
others) was resolved by guilty plea, with nothing in the court's records
to indicate the specifics of the bargaining process or the most important
factors underlying the negotiated settlements.
C. PFO P' Degree Prosecutions
One- As stated above, the number of cases with charges of persistent
felony offender in the first degree totaled 126 (out of 1400 cases with final
dispositions). In 104 of these cases, defendants were being prosecuted
("triggering offense") for the commission of relatively minor felonies
(lower level drug crimes in 33 cases, minor property crimes such as theft
and knowingly receiving stolen property in 47 cases, and other minor
crimes like flagrant nonsupport and bail jumping in 24 cases); in only 18
of the 126 cases were defendants being prosecuted for crimes that would
be regarded as serious or dangerous by most scholars (with four cases
involving prosecutions for crimes resting on the border between serious
and nonserious). In other words, if one looks only at "triggering offenses,"
the PFO 1st law was used in this jurisdiction against nondangerous or
nonserious offenders by an overwhelming margin.
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Two: A very similar picture emerges from an examination of the
convictions used as "strikes" against these offenders. In 93 of the 126 cases
(about 75 percent of the total), the defendants had only nondangerous
or nonserious crimes on their records (and in all of these cases-93 of
126-the defendants were being prosecuted for "triggering offenses" that
were nondangerous and nonserious). In 10 of the 18 cases in which the
defendants were charged with serious or dangerous "triggering offenses,"
they had no "strikes" that would qualify as serious or dangerous and in 4 of
the 18 cases they had one earlier conviction that would so qualify; in only
4 of 126 cases did defendants have both a dangerous or serious "triggering
offense" and two convictions that would qualify as dangerous or serious
"strikes." In other words, if the repeat offender laws described in Part III
above and in the appendix to this article were substituted for the Kentucky
repeat offender law, no more than 4 of the 126 offenders in the study would
have qualified for "three strikes" prosecution and the tough penalties that
follow.7
Three: The final results of these cases leave no room for doubt that the
PFO P law achieves its objective of imposing on repeat offenders very
harsh punishments, sometimes visible and measurable and sometimes
hidden from view. In about two-thirds of the cases in this part of the
study, defendants were punished as persistent felony offenders (62 PFO 11,
convictions and 21 PFO 2 nd convictions out of 126 prosecutions); in many
if not most of the others, defendants entered guilty pleas (without PFO
status) imposing punishments at the upper ends of penalty ranges for the
charged ("triggering") offenses. With appreciation of the fact that PFO
penalties are two or three (or more) times higher than normal penalties, it
is easy to see in these numbers a very real and substantial impact on inmate
populations from the operation of this part of the law.
But it takes a look beyond the numbers to see the effect of this law on
individual offenders, an effect that is predominated by a loss of relationship
between punishment and the conduct for which it is imposed (and shown
by a selection of representative cases from the study):
1. Darnell Jackson:76 He was accused of taking goods from Dillard's
Department Store and was indicted for theft and PFO 1' (with knowingly
receiving stolen property and low level burglary as prior convictions). He
was sentenced to one year in prison for the theft, had this sentence enhanced
to 10 years under the PFO, and was sent to state prison for 10 years for theft
75 The California three-strikes law is often cited by scholars as an example of a tough
repeat offender law: it allows for use of the law against offenders committing any felony crime
("triggering offense") but only if those offenders carried into the case two prior convictions
for "dangerous" crimes. See e.g., Beres & Griffith, supra note 41, at 103. CAL. PENAL CODE §
667 (West 1994). Even under this often-recognized-as-tough law, only 15 of the 126 cases
examined in this study would qualify for "three strikes" prosecution.




2. Mike Truglia:" He was accused to stealing a DVD player from K-Mart and
was indicted for theft and PFO 1' (based on a drug possession conviction
and burglary convictions from New Jersey). He was sentenced to 1 year for
the theft, had this sentence enhanced to 15 years by the PFO charge, and
was sent to prison for 15 years for theft of the DVD player.
3. Shawn Gifford:7' He was in the county jail serving time for a drug offense
(having violated conditions of drug court) and while in the jail managed by
forging court papers to get himself released during the day for community
work. After 46 days of such activities, he was arrested and charged with
escape in the second degree and PFO 11' (with prior convictions for
possession of forged instruments and credit card fraud). He got five years
for escape, had this sentence enhanced to 10 years by the PFO charge, and
was sent to prison for 10 years.79
4. Fay Williams-Slone-.8 She entered a coat factory twice for the purpose of
theft and stole goods (valued at less than $300). She was indicted for third
degree burglary (two counts), misdemeanor theft, and PFO 1st (based on
multiple prior convictions for possession of forged instruments). She was
sentenced to one year for third degree burglary, had this enhanced to 10
years by the PFO, and was sent to prison for 10 years for stealing less than
$300 worth of goods.
5. Billy Whittaker." He forged five checks for these amounts-$32, $40, $33,
$125, and $108. He was indicted for second-degree forgery (five counts)
and PFO 1st (with prior convictions for theft and flagrant nonsupport).
He was convicted of second-degree forgery (one count) and PFO Ist, was
sentenced to one year for forgery, had this enhanced to 10 years by the PFO
charge, and was sent to prison for 10 years (for theft of $333).
6. Robert Dawson:12 He was arrested for public intoxication and at booking
for this offense was found in possession of one gram of cocaine. He was
indicted for cocaine possession and PFO 1' (with prior convictions for drug
possession, bail jumping, and possession of a handgun by a convicted felon).
77 Comm. v. Mike Truglia, No. o3-CR-oo25o (Fay. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31 2003).
78 Comm. v. Shawn Gifford, No. 03-CR-oo58 3 (Fay. Cir. Ct. March 3, 2003).
79 The prosecution seemed to consider the activities of this defendant to be particularly
deserving of harsh punishment. He was away from the jail (on unapproved "work release")
for 46 days (always returning at night); he was indicted for 46 counts of escape in the second
degree (one for each day away from the jail). He entered a guilty plea to one count of the
indictment in return for dismissal of the other 45 and accepted a sentence for this conviction
at the top of the penalty range (one to five years for a class D felony). His guilty plea to the
PFO charge doubled his penalty and sent him to prison for Io years (for being away from the
jail on forged papers for one-and-a-half months during daylight hours only).
8o Comm. v. Fay Williams-Slone, No. 03-CR-oi 171 (Fay. Cir. Ct. May 6,2003).
81 Comm. v. Billy Whittaker, No. 03-CR-o354 (Fay. Cir. Ct. May 28, 2003).
82 Comm. v. Robert Dawson, No. 03-CR-o 1358 (Fay. Cir. Ct. June I1 2003).
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He was convicted of drug possession, sentenced to five years for this offense,
had this sentence enhanced to 20 years by the PFO charge, and was sent to
state prison for 20 years (for possession of one gram of cocaine).
7. William Hunt. After an arrest for driving without a license, he was
indicted for driving on a suspended license (a felony because of prior
DUI convictions) and PFO 1" (with prior convictions for receiving stolen
property and DUI 411 offense). He was convicted of driving on a suspended
license, was sentenced to one one year for this conviction, had this sentence
enhanced to 10 years by the PFO charge, and was sent to state prison for 10
years (for driving on a suspended license).
8. Bruce Beavers: 4 He was arrested while in possession of stolen CDs
and a CD storage tower and was indicted for knowingly receiving stolen
property and PFO 1 (with prior convictions for low-level property crimes
and burglary in the second degree). Upon conviction, he was sentenced to
a one year term for knowingly receiving stolen property, got an enhanced
sentence of 10 years under the PFO charge, and was sent to prison for 10
years (for possessing small amounts of stolen property).
9. Fotino Martinez:8s Arrested for public intoxication, he was found in
possession of a small amount of cocaine. He was indicted for possession
of cocaine and PFO 11" (with two prior convictions for DUI fourth). After
guilty pleas, he was sentenced to one year for drug possession, had this
sentence enhanced to 10 years by the PFO charge, and went to prison for
10 years for possession of a small amount of cocaine.
10. Andrian Richardson:6 He was arrested with a small amount of cocaine
on his person and was indicted for drug trafficking and PFO 1" (with prior
convictions for drug possession). He was convicted of drug possession, was
sentenced to 5 years for this offense, had this sentence enhanced to 10 years
by the PFO charge, and was sent to prison for 10 years for possession of a
small amount of cocaine.
The defendants in these cases were typical of defendants in the whole
study. They stood charged mostly with theft or possession of drugs (usually
cocaine), had prior felony convictions for the same kind of behavior (theft
and drug possession more often than not), and suffered punishments
grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of their crimes. In seven of the
10 cases, after being sentenced to one year in prison for the crimes they had
committed, defendants were labeled persistent felony offenders and sent
to prison for 10 years, a tenfold increase in punishments that are certain to
cost more than they are worth to both defendants and the state.
Conclusion: A repeat offender law that throws a blanket over all
83 Comm. v. William Hunt, No. o3-CR--ooi66 (Fay. Cir. Ct. June 16, 2003).
84 Comm. v. Bruce Beavers, No. o3-CR-oo9o9 (Fay. Cir. Ct. June 25, 2003).
85 Comm. v. Fortino Martinez, No. o3-CR-oi 197 (Fay. Cir. Ct. July 8, 2oo3).
86 Comm. v. Andrian Richardson, No. o3-CR-oI400 (Fay. Cir. Ct. Nov. 14 2003).
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offenders with a felony record, as Kentucky's does, is destined to squander
corrections resources by filling prison beds with many inmates who are
more threatening to themselves than to others. And, as the cases described
above show, it is destined to produce results that are totally at odds with
core values of a justice system that is committed above all else to the belief




One- The number of PFO 2 nd degree prosecutions (requiring but one
prior conviction) was higher than the number of PFO 1 s' prosecutions (176
to 126) but the dominant characteristic of the two types was exactly the
same - an overwhelming use of the law against low-level felony offenders.
Almost 90 percent of the PFO 2 nd degree cases (158 out of 176) involved
charges (or "triggering offenses") that would be classified as nonserious
or nondangerous by most standards, dominated by low-level drug crimes
(nearly a third of the subtotal), minor property felonies such as theft and
knowingly receiving stolen property (another third), and an assortment
of other low-level felonies such as nonsupport, bail jumping, and escape.
Similarly, an equally high percentage of the cases involved prior convictions
(or "strikes") of the same types; in a full two-thirds of these prosecutions
(116 of 176), the defendants arrived in court with prior convictions for minor
drug and property crimes. In 25 cases the defendants had prior convictions
for serious or dangerous crimes but in only two cases (out of 176) did the
defendants have both a dangerous or serious "triggering offense" and a
dangerous or serious prior conviction (or "strike"). In other words, substitute
for the Kentucky law a repeat offender statute like those described in Part
III (and in the appendix) and one will find but two defendants (out of 176)
qualifying for repeat offender prosecution and the harsher punishment that
almost always follows.
Two: One would expect the PFO 2 nd part of the law to have at least as
much effect on the inmate population as the PFO 1st part of the law, and
that expectation seems to be verified by the results of this study. In 68
percent of the PFO 2 nd prosecutions (119 out of 176 cases), defendants
were convicted under the PFO charges and in most given an enhanced
sentence. In many of the other cases, PFO charges appear to have been
dismissed in return for guilty pleas with penalties at the upper end of the
penalty ranges for the charged offenses. In a very high percentage of cases
(75 out of 119), penalties were enhanced from one year in prison (for the
charged offense) to five years in prison (for PFO 2 nd status); in 13 cases,
penalties were enhanced from one year in prison (for the charged offense)
87 Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REv. 67, 76 (Oct. 2005).
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to more than five but less than 10 years in prison (for PFO 2 nd status); and, in
12 cases penalties were enhanced from five years in prison (for the charged
offense) to 10 years in prison (for PFO 2 nd status).
Three- Looking beyond raw numbers to individual cases, one sees
above all else punishments that exceed by several orders of magnitude the
seriousness of the crimes for which they have been imposed:
1. Edward Roberts:88 He stole a pressure washer and a tape measure from
Wal-Mart and was charged with theft and PFO 2
n
d (with a prior conviction
for theft). He pleaded guilty to theft, was sentenced to one year in prison
for this offense, and had this sentenced enhanced to five years under the
PFO 2 nd charge. He was sent to drug court, violated conditions of probation,
and was sent to prison for five years.
2. Edward L. West:9. He was charged with cocaine possession (a class C
felony because of a prior drug conviction) and with PFO 2 nd (because of a
prior conviction for flagrant nonsupport). He pleaded guilty to possession
of drugs, was sentenced to five years for this offense, got an enhancement
to 10 years under the PFO charge, and was sent to prison for 10 years for
drug possession.
3. April Gray:' She took a check (for $2,000) from a house she cleaned and
forged it. She was charged with possession of a forged instrument and PFO
2 nd (with a prior conviction for possession of a forged instrument). She
entered a plea to both counts, was sentenced to 1 year for the possession
charge, had this sentenced enhanced to five years by the PFO 2 ad charged,
and was sent to prison for five years.
4. Donald Redman:91 He was charged with credit card fraud and PFO 2 ,d
(with a prior conviction for obtaining drugs by fraud). He was sentenced
to one year for credit card fraud, had this sentence enhanced to five years
under the PFO 2 nd charge and was sent to prison for five years.
5. Ale Roy Keith:9 He wrote a cold check for $5,320 and was charged with
theft and PFO 2 nd (with prior conviction for theft). He was sentenced to
one year in prison for the theft, had this sentence enhanced to five years by
the PFO 2 nd charge, and was sent to prison for five years.
88 Comm. v. Edward Roberts, No. o3-CR--ooz69 (Fay. Cir. Ct. Jan. 25, 2003).
89 Comm. v. Edward L. West, No. 03-CR-oo582 (Fay. Cir. Ct. June 15, 2003).
90 Comm. v. April Gray, No. 03-CR-oo752 (Fay. Cir. Ct. July 15, 2003).
9i Comm. v. Donald Redman, No. o3-CR-oo98z (Fay. Cir. Ct. Aug. 1, 2003).
92 Comm. v. Ale Roy Keith, No. o3-CR-oo916 (Fay. Cir. Ct. Sept. 12, 2003).
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6. Jason Brammer.93 He made a false statement to obtain drugs from a
pharmacy, was charged with obtaining drugs by fraud (which treats attempt
like the completed crime) and PFO 2 nd (with prior conviction for third degree
burglary). He pleaded guilty, was sentenced to one year for attempting to
obtain drugs by fraud, had this sentenced enhanced to five years by the
PFO 2
"d charge, and was sent to prison for five years.
7. Robert Baker.94 He failed to provide support for two children and was
charged with flagrant nonsupport and PFO 2nd (with prior conviction for
drug possession). He was sentenced to one year for flagrant nonsupport,
had this sentence enhanced to five years by the PFO 2nd charge, and was
sent to prison for five years for nonsupport of his children.
8. Keesha Saylor.95 She shoplifted clothes from Dillard's Department
Store and was prosecuted for theft and PFO 2 nd (with prior conviction for
third degree burglary). She was sentenced to two years for theft, had this
sentence enhanced to five years by the PFO 2nd charge, and was sent to
prison for five years.
9. Ron Sparks:96 He committed an act of theft in his place of employment
and was charged with theft and PFO 2nd (with a prior conviction for third
degree burglary). He pleaded guilty to both charges, was sentenced to one
year for theft, had this sentence enhanced to five years by the PFO charge,
and was sent to prison for five years.
10. Ronald Woods:97 He forged and cashed a check for $101 at Krogers and
was charged with possession of a forged instrument and PFO 2nd (with prior
convictions for theft and drug possession from one occurrence). He pleaded
guilty to both charges, was sentenced to one year for the forged check crime,
had this sentenced enhanced to five years by the PFO charge, and was sent
to prison for five years (for forging and cashing a $101 check).
The defendants in this set of cases look much like the ones in the PFO
1st cases described earlier. None can be labeled high risk offenders (with
nine of the 10 committing low-level theft or minor drug crimes) and none
can be said to have had a previous record of serious or dangerous crimes.
The PFO effect on the defendants (as well as its inflationary pressure on
the inmate population) is significant and undeniable; in 80 percent of the
cases (eight of 10) defendants were sentenced to one year in prison for
the crimes they had committed but sent to prison for five years as PFO
93 Comm. v. Jason Brammer, No. o3-CR-o1482 (Fay. Cir. Ct. Sept. 12, 2003).
94 Comm. v. Robert Baker, No. 03-CR-o0313 (Fay. Cir. Ct. April H, 2003).
95 Comm. v. Keesha Saylor, No. 03-CR-oo376 (Fay. Cir. Ct. April 17, 2003).
96 Comm. v. Ron Sparks, No. o3-CR-oo653 (Fay. Cir. Ct. May 29, 2003).
97 Comm. v. Ronald Woods, No. o3-CR-o 159o (Fay. Cir. Ct. Dec. i, 2003).
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offenders. Quadrupled sentences for the commission of trivial felonies
by defendants who have never committed violent acts is a roadmap to
overcrowded prisons and jails, one that appears to have been heavily used
in PFO 2 nd prosecution in Fayette County.
Conclusion: The problem with a repeat offender law that extends
coverage to all defendants with a felony record is that it will catch in its
net an occasional defendant who is a threat to public safety and a horde of
defendants who are more of a public nuisance than a threat. The costs of
catching that occasional serious offender are a steady flow of commitments
to prison like the ones described above, a substantial drain on the state
treasury, and an exacerbation of conditions in state prisons and jails that
have already made them look more like storage bins than houses of reform.
And to what end, if not an illusion that aggressive action against repeat
offenders (under the PFO laws) will provide a quick-fix to the crime
problem?
V. PFO PRACTICES IN SCOTT COUNTY
A. Introduction
Repeat offender laws have long presented the justice system with a
great risk of unprincipled disparity in the treatment of defendants, because
of the almost unlimited power of prosecutors to determine the charges to
be brought and pursued in a given case:
Although always dominant and influential, the prosecutor now essentially
controls the criminal justice system .... Prosecutors decide whether to
charge an individual with a criminal offense, and what the charge should
be .... That decision is left to the prosecutor, who has an almost unlimited
amount of discretion in making this determination.9"
The risk inherent in repeat offender laws is a variation in the use of the
laws from one county (or jurisdiction) to another and a consequential
unevenness of justice that is sometimes called "justice by geography."99
With this in mind, the author went to an adjoining county for a second
study of how the state's PFO law is used against real defendants in real
cases but by a different prosecutor.
B. Scope of the Study
It was necessary in this instance to review all criminal prosecutions for a
98 Angela J. Davis, Incarceration and the Imbalance of Power, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT:
'THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS INCARCERATION, 63 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-
Lind, eds., 2002).
99 See Marion, supra note 41, at 29.
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two-year period (2002 and 2003) in order to have a reasonably comparable
study to the one described above. All circuit court files were reviewed from
grand jury indictment to final disposition and included 175 cases for 2002
and 169 for year 2003, a total of slightly less than 350 and about 25 percent
of the number of cases reviewed for the Fayette County study. In one
important respect the second study was different from the first, because
of differences in the content of the court files. The indictments in Scott
County alleged PFO violations without identifying the felonies underlying
prior convictions and there was never any disclosure of this information in
the court's records (mostly because the PFO cases all ended with guilty
pleas); thus, the extent to which the PFO law was here used against
offenders without a history of serious crime could not be determined.
C. Findings (Scott County)
The PFO 1s' law was used in 13 cases in the two years under review,
seven in 2002 and six in 2003. In not a single case was this part of the law
used against an offender then charged with a serious crime. It was used
mostly against minor drug and low level property offenders and occasionally
against offenders charged with nonsupport of children or some other low-
level felony. The results from this group of prosecutions included one PFO
11 conviction' °° and four PFO 2 nd convictions;
°l in addition, as in Fayette
County, the results also included guilty pleas in most of the other PFO 1t
cases with penalties at the upper end of the ranges for the charged offense
(probably in return for dismissal of the PFO charges).
The PFO 2 nd law was used in 25 cases during the two years of the study,
12 in 2002 and 13 in 2003. In two cases, it was used in the prosecution
of serious offenses (one in each year); in the others, it was used in the
prosecution of minor offenses (mostly low level drug and property crimes).
The results included three PFO 2 nd convictions (one in 2002 and two
ioo The defendant in this case entered an unoccupied residence and took property, was
charged with theft and burglary in the second degree, was convicted of both as well as PRO
ist, and was sentenced to prison for 12 years with PFO status. See Comm. v. Donald Nelson,
No. 02-CR- 00159 (Scott County Cir. Ct., July 19, 2002).
ioi Comm. v. George Robinson, No. o3-CR-ooo26 (Scott County Cir. Ct., Jan. 1, 2003)
(defendant attempted flight from police while driving under the influence, had a collision with
the police vehicle, was charged with wanton endangerment, criminal mischief, other minor
crimes, and PFO ill, was convicted of wanton endangerment and other minor crimes and PFO
2 nd, and was sentenced to five years in prison); Comm. v. Randolph Harris, No. o3-CR-oool
(Scott County Cir. Ct., April 17, 2003) (defendant wrote cold checks for four-wheeler vehicles,
was charged with theft and PFO ill, was convicted of theft and PFO 2 nd, and was sentenced to
five years in prison with PFO status); Comm. v. Bobby Townsend II, No. o3-CR-oo157 (Scott
County Cir. Ct., Nov. 3, 2003) (defendant entered private storage units and was found with
stolen property in his possession, was charged with burglary third degree, knowingly receiving
stolen property, and PFO ill, was convicted of both triggering offenses and PFO 2 nd, and was
sent to prison for five years with PFO status).
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in 2003) and 12 additional cases in which penalties appear to have been
enhanced to higher levels in return for dismissals of the PFO charges.
D. Comparisons (with Fayette County)
The PFO law was used against slightly more than one-fourth of the
defendants prosecuted in Fayette County (378 out of 1400 cases or 27
percent) and against slightly more than one-tenth of the defendants
prosecuted in Scott County (38 out of 344 or 11 percent). The difference
in PFO 11" prosecutions in the two jurisdictions was somewhat greater than
the difference in PFO 2 nd prosecutions; the tougher weapon was used in 11
percent of the cases in Fayette (153 out of 1400) and in 3.75 percent of the
cases in Scott County (13 out of 344).
A more aggressive use of the PFO weapon in Fayette County is even
more clearly reflected in the results produced by PFO prosecutions in the
two jurisdictions. Only eight defendants were convicted of PFO charges in
Scott County while 203 defendants were so convicted in Fayette County
(2.3 percent of all cases in Scott County and 14.5 percent of all cases in
Fayette County); only 1 defendant was convicted of PFO 1s in Scott County
while 62 defendants were so convicted in Fayette County (.2 percent of all
cases in Scott County versus 4.5 percent of all cases in Fayette County).
In one important respect, there was little difference in the findings from
the two studies. The PFO law was rarely used against serious/dangerous
offenders in either county (in only two of 28 PFO prosecutions in Scott
County and in 36 of 378 cases in Fayette County), meaning that it was used
against nonserious and nondangerous offenders more than 90 percent of
the time. In both Scott and Fayette, the law was used most prominently
against low level drug and minor property offenders.
E. Conclusion
Perhaps the offender groups in these adjoining counties are different
enough to account for disparities in the use of the PFO laws, perhaps not.
A second, and more probable, explanation is the presence of significant
variations in the exercise of an unguided prosecutorial discretion that is
inherent to this and all other repeat offender laws. In an earlier era, in his
acclaimed book on sentencing, Judge Marvin Frankel spoke very harshly
about unchecked sentencing discretion in judges:
... As to the penalty that may be imposed, our laws characteristically leave
to the sentencing judge a range of choice that should be unthinkable in a
"government of laws, not of men." To underscore it by repetition, my first
basic point is this: the almost wholly unchecked and sweeping powers we
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give to judges in fashioning sentences are terrifying and intolerable for a
society that professes devotion to the rule of law.'
02
It is not hard to imagine what the judge would have said about unchecked
discretion in the hands of prosecutors, exercised in the shadows of a law
office rather than in the open light of a courtroom and capable of producing
for identical crimes a soft or hard penalty depending upon whether they
occurred on one or the other side of a county line.
VI. A FOOTNOTE ON DISAPPEARING TIALS
In criminal law trenches and circles, there is some quiet conversation
these days about the "disappearing criminal trial," conversation that always
involves prosecutorial discretion and the elevated leverage that has fallen
into prosecution hands as a byproduct of the war-on-crime's tougher
penalties. In most war-on-crime literature there is a widespread recognition
and acceptance of the reality of this shift of power and a growing concern
about its effect on the justice system:
... Draconian sentencing laws have automatically increased the significance
of prosecutorial decisions and have impaired an already broken system by
radically tilting the delicate balance of the adversarial system toward the
prosecutor. As the balance of power has shifted toward the prosecutor, the
roles of the defense attorney and judge have weakened.
... Because prosecutors can control the sentencing range, they can control
the likely (expected) differential in sentence after plea and after trial. And
it is the plea/trial differential that reflects prosecutorial dominance and has
led to the virtual disappearance of criminal trials in the federal system (and
a parallel trend in many states).'13
In this article about the state's PFO law there is no room for a discussion
of the "disappearing criminal trial," just a footnote about some findings that
are consistent with a dramatic downturn in trial rates and a fear of excessive
prosecutorial power over punishments.
There was no intent in the first of the two field studies described
above to gather data on trial rates, although by the end of the review (of
approximately 1400 cases) it was crystal clear that guilty plea was the rule
and trial a rare exception to the rule. Ahead of the second field study
described above, with "disappearing trials" in mind, the author ventured
into the Bureau of Justice Statistics (the best of all sources of criminal law
i02 MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (I972).
103 Miller, supra note 62, at 1257-58.
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data) for a look at trial rates in the federal system, finding through that
effort the information that is presented in Figure 3 below:
Figure 3
Percentage of Convictions by Guilty Plea
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Source: United States Bureau of Justice Statistics' 4
In 1982, the war-on-crime hit full stride in the federal system, with the
creation of a sentencing commission, tougher penalties, and the abolition of
parole. Ahead of these events, nearly 20 percent of all federal convictions
resulted from trial (with about 80 percent resulting from guilty pleas); in
2005, only about 4 percent of federal convictions resulted from trial (with
about 96 percent resulting from guilty pleas).1"5 Thus, the claim that there
has been a "virtual disappearance"" of trials in the federal system is no
more than a slight exaggeration of the truth.
The second field study described above was conducted with an additional
item on the agenda-the extent to which trial was chosen over disposition
by guilty plea. The results provide no comfort to those concerned about
the disappearing criminal trial and the consequential movement of power
over punishment into the hands of the prosecution. The study covered
two years of felony prosecutions, included an examination of 344 cases (175
in 2002 and 169 in 2003), and on the point under discussion ended with
an incredible finding. The number of defendants choosing trial over plea
bargaining was exactly two, an average of one trialperyearandabout .5percent
of the total number of cases before the court. It might be different in other courts
or in this court in a different time period. But it might not be different
104 U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Defendants Disposed of in U.S. District Court,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, http.www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t522zoo5.
pdf (last visited on April I, 2oo8).
1O5 It is notable and not surprising that during this period there was a significant decline
in the percentage of cases producing acquittals (from 3.6 percent in 198o to 0.6 percent in
2005) and in the percentage of cases not producing convictions (from 21.8 percent in 198o to
Io.I percent in 2005). See Id.
1o6 See Miller, supra note 62, at 1258.
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elsewhere or at another time, suggesting a need, maybe even an urgent
need, for further study of the so-called "disappearing trial."
CONCLUSION
Once reserved for rare use against incorrigible offenders (twice
incarcerated and still offending), Kentucky's PFO law now awaits
every defendant who arrives in court with a felony record. It supplies
prosecutors with sentencing weapons that exist in very few states, inflates
the prosecution's already extraordinary power over punishment, deflates
the judge's role in that crucial decision, pushes some of the law's most
important decisions out of the sunshine and into the shadows, and, in
conjunction with other sentencing weapons, elevates the risk of trial to
almost intolerable levels. Exemplifying our undeniable enthusiasm for
incarceration, it deserves a lion's share of credit for the inmate explosion
that has overcrowded our prisons and done far worse to our jails.
The long reach of this law absolutely guarantees inmate population
growth and resulting stress for prisons and jails. It once produced a mere
handful of inmates saddled with long sentences (79 in year 1980) but now
delivers a handful of such inmates to the corrections system every week of
every month of every year (with a cumulative total of 4187 by year 2004);
and its impact extends beyond the numbers who arrive in the system as
PFO inmates to include an untold number who accept higher than normal
penalties in return for dismissal of PFO charges. It can be used against
violent offenders (who would qualify for severe punishment without the
law) but is far more likely to be used against felony offenders who pose
very little if any threat to public safety (shoplifters, auto thieves, low-level
burglars, drug users, etc.). It is said that "three strikes" legislation is little
more than a "costly slogan," 107 reflecting a widely held belief that benefits
from long incarcerations are substantially outweighed by their enormous
and varied costs.
Some of the costs of Kentucky's PFO law are obvious and measurable,
for example, average annual incarceration costs of $18,613 for prison
inmates, 1°8 substantially higher than average costs for aging and unhealthy
inmates, °'9 and prison construction that has recently cost about $100,000
per inmate occupant.Y0 Some are less obvious, less measurable, and less
107 Peter J. Benekos & Alida V. Merlo, Three Strikes and You're Out!: The Political Sentencing
Game, 59 FED. PROBATION 3, 8 (1995).
io8 Kentucky Department of Corrections, Cost of Incarceration, FY 2006-2007 (undat-
ed) (unpublished list, on file with author).
In9 Id. (the annual cost of incarceration for inmates at the Kentucky State Reformatory-
where older and ill inmates are imprisoned-is the highest in the system at $ 26,578 per in-
mate).
11o As stated in footnote 15, supra, the state spent $87 million to build its most recent
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appreciated, for example, the need to incarcerate 8000 state inmates for
service of lengthy sentences in local jails,"' inadequate rehabilitation
efforts in prisons and especially jails, and weak reintegration efforts for
inmates upon release from custody. There is reason to believe that the
most legitimate purposes of punishment are jeopardized by this law:
Criminal penalties should not ... cause individual or social harms which
outweigh their crime-controlling effects or other benefits .... Penalties
should not be more severe or more costly than necessary; if the same
crime-control and other benefits can be achieved with less severe or less
costly methods, those methods should be preferred. In a world of limited
resources, punishment must also be prioritized. Prison beds and other
scarce correctional resources should be reserved for the most socially
harmful offenses and offenders. Prisons must also not be used beyond
their effective capacities. Overcrowded prisons are unsafe for prisoners and
staff, and reduced security and resources for programming increase the odds
that prisoners will leave prison more violent or antisocial than when they
entered .... "1
And beyond all this, there is reason to fear for the most basic of all
principles of criminal justice-fair, just, even, and morally defensible
punishments. Judge Marvin Frankel said in his book on Criminal Sentences
that "we are all demeaned when we proceed in the name of the law to
be arbitrary, cruel, and lawless."'1 3 Speaking with particular reference to
sentencing and punishment, he also said:
... The law's detachment is thought to be one of our triumphs. There is
dignity and security in the assurance that each of us-plain or beautiful, rich
or poor, black, white, tall, curly, whatever-is promised treatment as a bland,
fungible 'equal' before the law.
114
There is no detachment in a repeat offender law that leaves in
partisan hands an unchecked, unguided, and largely unreviewable power
to determine just how long citizens may be imprisoned or jailed for
misbehavior. There is nothing "bland" or "fungible" about the treatment of
offenders under a PFO law that allows for widely divergent punishments of
citizens who have committed the same or similar crimes under the same or
similar circumstances, all dependent upon the values and judgments of the
prosecutors who will ultimately dictate punishments. In a system that is
prison (zooo) and in that prison at this time the state holds 989 inmates.
i ii See Kentucky Department of Corrections, Statewide Population Report No.
IPTR5oo-I 8 (February 29, 2oo8) (unpublished population report, on file with author).
i 12 Frase, supra note 87, at 72-73.
113 FRANKEL, supra note I02, at x.
114 Id. at p. ii.
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committed to the rule of law, there is no room for punishment that depends
upon the good faith and sound judgment of lawyers who are obligated by
duty and empowered by law to intrude upon individual freedom in order




1. Type. only a three-strikes law.
2. Triggering Offense- crimes involving danger to person (such as arson, high
level burglary, homicide, robbery, and kidnapping), listed sex offenses, or
drug trafficking.
3. Strike. any conviction of one of the foregoing serious crimes.
4. Penalties: normal penalties are enhanced to life in prison.
ILLINOIS'
16
1. Type. only three-strikes laws (Types 1 and 2).
2. Triggering Offense for Type 1 repeat offenders, the triggering offense is
sexual assault, is, degree murder, or a crime from the state's highest felony
class and for Type 2 repeat offenders a triggering offense must be a "serious
felony offense."
3. Strike. for Type I repeat offenders, a strike must be a conviction for
criminal assault, Is degree murder, aggravated kidnapping, or other felony
from the state's highest felony class and for Type 2 must be a "serious felony
offense."
4. Penalties: for Type 1 repeat offenders, normal penalties are enhanced to
life imprisonment and for Type 2 they are enhanced to a term of 6 to 30
years in prison.
MAINE" 7
1. Type only a three-strikes law.
2. Triggering Offense a dangerous felony crime (crimes against persons, sexual
assault, kidnapping, robbery, burglary of a dwelling, and assault of a police
officer or emergency medical provider).
3. Strike: any conviction for a dangerous felony (from the above list).
4. Penalties: for the third strike, normal penalties are elevated one level
(from class B to class A, from class C to class B, etc.).
MONTANA
1 8
1. Types: a two-strikes and a three-strikes law.
2. Triggering Offense. for two strikes, the triggering offense is a serious
offense of either deliberate homicide, rape, aggravated kidnapping, child
sexual abuse, or ritual abuse of a minor, and for three strikes it is mitigated
deliberate homicide, aggravated assault, kidnapping, robbery, or aggravated
promotion of prostitution.
115 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. ii, § 4214 (1987).
]I6 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/33B-i. (LexisNexis 1994).
117 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1252.
118 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-219 (1997).
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3. Strike- under the two-strikes law, a strike is a prior conviction of a serious
offense that would qualify as a two-strikes triggering offense and under the
three-strikes law, a strike is a prior conviction for a crime that would qualify
as a triggering offense under either of the repeat offender laws.
4. Penalties: for two-strikes, normal penalties are elevated to life




1. Type- only a two-strikes law.
2. Triggering Offense. a felony crime that seriously endangered the life or
safety of another person.
3. Strike- a conviction for a felony offense and a personality disorder
indicating a propensity toward crimes that seriously endanger life or safety
of another.
4. Penalties: the maximum penalty for the triggering offense is elevated




1. Types: two-strikes, three-strikes, and a separate two-strikes for murder.
2. Triggering Offense- murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, aggravated
assault, deviate sexual intercourse, arson, kidnapping, burglary of a dwelling,
robbery, or attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit these offenses for
the general two and three strikes laws and, of course, murder is the triggering
offense for the separate two-strikes law for murder.
3. Strike. a conviction for a crime of violence from the list of triggering
offenses (for the general two and three-strikes laws) and a prior conviction
for either murder or voluntary manslaughter for the separate two-strikes
law for murder.
4. Penalties: a minimum sentence of 5 or 10 years for the general two-strikes
law, a minimum sentence of 25 years for the general three-strikes law, and




1. Type: only a three-strikes law.
2. Triggering Offense- a "violent felony" (from a long list).
3. Strikes: prior convictions for "violent felonies" committed on two separate
occasions and resulting in actual imprisonment for those convictions.
4. Penalties: normal penalties are elevated to higher levels and at the highest
level require consideration of offender's history in parole decisions.
119 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.725 AND 161.605.
120 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9714 AND 9715.





1. Types: three-strikes and four-strikes laws.
2. Triggering Offense. "felony crime of violence" for three-strikes law and
"any felony crime" for the four strikes law.
3. Strike: conviction for "felony crime of violence" for three-strikes law and
conviction for "any felony crime" for the four-strikes law.
4. Penalties: normal penalties are elevated to a prison term of "up to and
including life" for both laws.
WASHINGTON'
2 3
1. Types: two-strikes and three-strikes laws.
2. Triggering Offense. for the two-strikes law, a serious sex offense (from a
short list) or some other major offense committed with a sexual motivation
(murder, kidnapping, and the like), and for the three-strikes law, a "most
serious offense" (from a short list of crimes causing/threatening death or
serious harm to persons).
3. Strike- for two-strikes, a conviction of a crime that would qualify as a
triggering offense and for three-strikes, two convictions for "most serious
offenses" from two separate incidents.
4. Penalties: normal penalties are elevated to life imprisonment without
privilege of parole for both laws.
WYOMING'
2 4
1. Types: three-strikes and four-strikes laws.
2. Triggering Offense- a violent felony.
3. Strikes: prior convictions for felony crimes that were committed on
separate occasions.
4. Penalties: for three-strikes, imprisonment for 10 to 50 years and for four-
strikes life imprisonment.
122 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13§§ ii and i la.
123 WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.94A.30 and 9.94A.505.
124 WYO.STAT.ANN.§6-I0-2OI (1988).
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